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ABSTRACT
Different agents may have different points of view. This can
be modelled using different abstract argumentation frame-
works, each consisting of a set of arguments and a binary
attack-relation between them. A question arising in this
context is whether the diversity of views observed in such a
profile of argumentation frameworks is consistent with the
assumption that every individual argumentation framework
is induced by a combination of, first, some basic factual
attack-relation between the arguments and, second, the per-
sonal preferences of the agent concerned. We treat this ques-
tion of rationalisability of a profile as an algorithmic problem
and identify tractable and intractable cases. This is useful
for understanding what types of profiles can reasonably be
expected to come up in a multiagent system.
Keywords
Argumentation; Social Choice Theory
1. INTRODUCTION
The model of abstract argumentation introduced by
Dung [12] is at the root of a vast amount of work in ar-
tificial intelligence and multiagent systems. In a nutshell,
this model abstracts away from the content of an argument,
and thus sees argumentation frameworks as directed graphs,
where the nodes are arguments and the edges are attacks
between arguments—in the sense that one argument under-
cuts or contradicts another argument. Different semantics
provide principled approaches to selecting sets of arguments
that can be viewed as coherent when taken together. The
simplicity and generality of this framework, as well as its
links with nonmonotonic reasoning, have stimulated a num-
ber of directions of research, e.g., at the level of the definition
of the semantics, of their computation, of the expressivity
of such frameworks, or regarding their application in a mul-
tiagent system.
In recent years, a number of authors have addressed the
problem of aggregating several argumentation frameworks,
each associated with the stance taken by a different indi-
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vidual agent, into a single collective argumentation frame-
work that would appropriately represent the views of the
group as a whole. Examples include the contributions of
Coste-Marquis et al. [11], Tohme´ et al. [27], Bodanza and
Auday [8], and Dunne et al. [14]. Aggregating argumen-
tation frameworks is a form of graph aggregation [15]: We
are given a profile of attack-relations, one for each agent,
and are asked to compute a suitable compromise attack-
relation. This is an interesting and fruitful line of research,
bringing together concerns in abstract argumentation with
the methodology of social choice theory,1 but it raises one
important question: For a given profile of argumentation
frameworks, is it in fact conceivable that that profile would
manifest itself? Intuitively speaking, it will often seem more
natural to encounter a profile with similar individual attack-
relations rather than one with attack-relations that differ
radically. How do we explain the differences in perspective
of the individual agents for a given profile?
The point that the attack-relation should not be viewed
as absolute and objective, but may very well depend on the
individual circumstances of the agent considering the argu-
ments in question, has been made before by multiple au-
thors [2, 4, 9, 17, 16]. In fact, it is central to the study of
argumentation, as also suggested by Modgil [22], who noted
that abstract argumentation frameworks“should more prop-
erly be viewed as modelling human reasoning and debate,
rather than as abstractions of underlying theories in some
formal logic.” A widespread explanation for such diversity
of views is that agents have different preferences regarding
the arguments at hand. For instance, arguments may come
from different sources, which agents may trust more or less.
Or arguments may be attached to different values, which
agents may prioritise differently. This perspective still as-
sumes an underlying ground truth, which however may be
interpreted differently, depending on the agents. The same
position is also taken by Searle [26]:
“Assume universally valid and accepted stan-
dards of rationality, assume perfectly rational
agents operating with perfect information, and
1The approach sketched here must be clearly distinguished
from a second approach combining abstract argumentation
and social choice theory found in the literature, which ad-
dresses the question of how to aggregate different exten-
sions (or labellings) for a common argumentation frame-
work. This is the approach of, amongst others, Caminada
and Pigozzi [10] as well as Rahwan and Tohme´ [24]. Bodanza
and Auday [8] compare the two approaches explicitly.
you will find that rational disagreement will still
occur; because, for example, the rational agents
are likely to have different and inconsistent val-
ues and interests, each of which may be rationally
acceptable.” (page xv)
In the literature on abstract argumentation, frameworks
for modelling this phenomenon have been proposed by sev-
eral authors, including Amgoud and Cayrol [1] and Bench-
Capon [6]. Here we adopt a preference-based approach, in
the value-based variant originally due to Bench-Capon [6].
In his model, whether argument A ultimately defeats argu-
ment B does not only depend on whether A attacks B in an
objective sense, but also on how we rank the importance of
the social or moral values attached to A and B: If we rank
the value associated with B strictly above that associated
with A, we may choose to ignore any attacks of A on B.
At the technical level, we thus ask the following
question: Given a profile of argumentation frameworks
pAF1, . . . ,AFnq, one for each agent, can this profile be ex-
plained in terms of a single master argumentation frame-
work, an association of arguments with values, and a profile
of preference orders over values pě1, . . . ,ěnq, one for each
agent? Or, as we shall put it: Can the profile of argumen-
tation frameworks observed be rationalised? To be able to
answer this question in the affirmative, for every agent i, we
require AFi to be exactly the argumentation framework we
obtain when the master argumentation framework with its
associated values is reduced using the preference order ěi.
Of course, alternative justifications can be given for the
fact that individual argumentation frameworks may differ,
not just the preference-based explanation adopted here. In
particular, agents may interpret arguments differently, espe-
cially when they are incomplete [7]. Also, while we adopt
Bench-Capon [6]’s value-based approach as the technical
foundation on the basis of which to construct our frame-
work and for which to prove our results, there are alterna-
tive models of preference-based argumentation, for instance
relying on meta-level argumentation [21]. We do not wish to
commit to one specific view on the complex question of how
to best model preferences in argumentation (see the work of
Amgoud and Vesic [3] for an example of a contribution to
this debate). Indeed, we believe that our general point is
relevant beyond such specific modelling choices, and we see
our contribution to be first and foremost as a methodological
one. The same type of investigation could be undertaken for
other models as well.2 In a sense, this multiplicity of models
is precisely what makes our contribution useful: by provid-
ing a collection of results that allow to check whether a pro-
file can be rationalised on such grounds, we provide evidence
for guiding the modelling process. The good news is that in
many—albeit not all—cases verification of rationalisability
can be performed efficiently, even when the assignment of
values to arguments is not known beforehand.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the relevant background regarding value-
based argumentation. Section 3 formally introduces the
problem of rationalising a given profile of argumentation
frameworks provided by a set of agents, and presents the
2While some preference-based approaches are special cases
of the one used here—e.g., in the work of Amgoud and Cay-
rol [1] each argument is mapped to a different value—others
would require extensions, e.g., allowing several values per
argument as in the work of Kaci and van der Torre [19].
different types of constraints on solutions we will consider.
Section 4 analyses the single-agent case in detail, while Sec-
tion 5 investigates the multiagent case. Finally, Section 6
discusses a number of application scenarios for our approach
and Section 7 concludes with a review of open questions and
possible directions for future work.
2. NOTATION AND TERMINOLOGY
Following Dung [12], below we define an argumentation
framework (AF) as a binary attack-relation declared over
a set of arguments. We will restrict ourselves to scenarios
for which the set of available arguments is finite.
Definition 1 (AF). An argumentation framework is a
pair AF “ xArg,áy, where Arg is a finite set of arguments
and á, the attack-relation, is an irreflexive binary relation
defined on Arg.
If Aá B holds for A,B P Arg, then we say that A attacks B.
Example 1. Pollution in the big cities is becoming a ma-
jor health problem. City councils are facing the question
of possibly banning polluting vehicles, and specifically diesel
cars, from the inner centres of such cities. A city council
might be entertaining the following arguments:
pAq Diesel cars should be banned from in the inner city
centre in order to decrease pollution.
pBq Artisans, who deserve special protection by the city
council, cannot change their vehicles, as that would be
too expensive for them.
pCq The city can offer financial assistance to artisans.
pDq There are few alternatives: autonomy of electric cars is
poor, as there are not enough charging stations around.
pEq The city can set up more charging stations.
pF q In times of financial crisis, the city should not commit
to spending additional money.
pGq Health and climate change issues are important, so the
city has to spend what is needed to tackle pollution.
The following graph shows the AF generated by these argu-
ments and a natural attack-relation á between them:
A
BC
DE
FG
Observe that for this AF it is ambiguous whether or not we
should accept argument A and ban diesel cars: Accepting
either tA,C,E,Gu or tB,D,F u is intuitively admissible.
Recall that a preorder is a binary relation that is reflexive
and transitive, and a weak order in addition is also com-
plete [25]. We use preorders and weak orders to model pref-
erences. Using a preorder means allowing for strict pref-
erences, indifferences, and incomparabilities, while using a
weak order excludes the possibility of two items being in-
comparable. We will use the terms ‘preference order’ and
‘preorder’ synonymously, i.e., a ‘complete preference order’
refers to a weak order. The strict part of a preference or-
der ě is denoted as ą and its indifference part as „.
Following Bench-Capon [6], we define an audience-specific
value-based argumentation framework (AVAF) as an AF
equipped with a function associating each argument with
the social or moral value it advances, combined with a pref-
erence order declared over those values. While the mapping
from arguments to values is fixed, the preferences over values
are those of a particular agent (the “audience”).
Definition 2 (AVAF). An audience-specific value-
based argumentation framework is defined as a 5-tuple
xArg,á,Val, val,ěy, where xArg,áy is an argumentation
framework, Val is a finite set of values, val : Arg Ñ Val is a
mapping from arguments to values, and ě is the audience’s
preference order on Val.
We call xVal, val y the AVAF’s value-labelling. Let“val be the
equivalence relation on arguments induced by val: A “val B
if and only if valpAq “ valpBq.
Now suppose an agent is presented with an AF and a
value-labelling. In Bench-Capon’s model [6], this agent will
uphold a proposed attack Aá B and therefore accept that
A defeats B, unless she strictly prefers the value associated
with B to the value associated with the attacker A.
Definition 3 (Defeated Arguments). Given an
AVAF xArg,á,Val, val,ěy, we say that argument A P Arg
defeats argument B P Arg, denoted AÝ B, if and only if
AáB but not valpBq ą valpAq.
We call Ý the defeat-relation induced by the AVAF. Note
that saying ‘valpBq ą valpAq is not the case’ is the same as
saying ‘valpAq ě valpBq is the case’ only when the preference
order ě is complete.
Note that for any given AVAF xArg,á,Val, val,ěy the
induced defeat-relation Ý is, just like an attack-relation á,
an irreflexive binary relation on Arg. That is, we can (and
will) think of xArg,Ýy as just another AF.
Example 1 (continued). Recall our earlier example
about the arguments pondered by our city council. We can
associate the arguments presented in this example with four
types of values. Arguments A and G concern environmen-
tal responsibility (env), B and C are about social fairness
(soc), F promotes economic viability (econ), and D and E
pertain to infrastructure efficiency (infra). We thus have
that Val “ tenv, soc, econ, infrau, as well as that valpAq “
valpGq “ env, valpBq “ valpCq “ soc, valpF q “ econ, and
valpDq “ valpEq “ infra.
Let us now assume that a particular councillor wants to
promote the values of environmental responsibility and in-
frastructure efficiency over the other two values. So her
preferences might be given by the following weak order:
env „ infra ą soc „ econ
This induces a defeat-relation Ý for our councillor that cor-
responds to the following graph:
A
BC
DE
FG
That is, three attacks have been removed. For this new AF it
is unambiguously clear that argument A should be accepted
(the only argument attacking A is itself attacked by an argu-
ment without any remaining attackers), and thus that diesel
cars should be banned from the city centre.
In the sequel, we use standard set-theoretical operations
(e.g., X, Ď) on binary relations (understood as sets of pairs).
Furthermore, R´1 “ tpx, yq | yRxu is the inverse of a bi-
nary relation, R` its transitive closure, and R˚ its reflexive-
transitive closure. R ˝ R1 is the composition of R and R1.
We also define R`val :“ pRY“valq˚ ˝R˝pRY“valq˚, which is
like the usual transitive closure, except that we can move to
arguments with the same value, even if not connected by R.
3. THE RATIONALISABILITY PROBLEM
Let N “ t1, . . . , nu be a finite set of agents (or audiences).
Suppose each of these agents supplies us with an AF, not
necessarily over the same set of arguments.3 We call this
a profile of AF’s. Then we may ask whether the observed
profile can be rationalised (explained) in terms of a common
master AF and a common value-labelling, together with a
profile of preference orders, one for each agent. As we think
of each AF in the profile as the result of having imposed
the relevant agent’s preferences, we write individual AF’s
as xArgi,Ýiy (rather than as xArgi,áiy). Here, Argi is the
set of arguments agent i is aware of and Ýi is the defeat-
relation on Argi adopted by i. A profile of such AF’s is
denoted as AF “ pxArg1,Ý1y, . . . , xArgn,Ýnyq. Let Arg :“
Arg1 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ YArgn denote the set of all arguments.
We now define the rationalisability problem as the problem
of deciding whether a given profile can be rationalised in this
sense.4 In fact, we define an entire family of rationalisability
problems, parameterised by a set of constraints imposed on
the solutions admitted (concrete examples are given below).
Definition 4 (Rationalisability). A profile of AF’s
AF “ pxArg1,Ý1y, . . . , xArgn,Ýnyq is called rationalisable
under a given set of constraints, if there exist an attack-
relation á on Arg “ Arg1 Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y Argn, a set of val-
ues Val with a mapping val : Arg Ñ Val, and a profile
pě1, . . . ,ěnq of preference orders on Val, all meeting said
constraints, such that, for all agents i P N and all argu-
ments A,B P Argi, it is the case that AÝi B if and only if
Aá B but not valpBq ąi valpAq.
We will refer to xArg,áy as the master AF, and conse-
quently to á as the master attack-relation.
In this paper, we will consider the following types of con-
straints (but others may be of interest as well):
‚ the master attack-relation á may be fixed,
‚ the value-labelling xVal, val y may be fixed,
‚ the number of values may be bounded from above,
‚ the preference orders may be required to be complete.
3A common assumption in the literature on the aggregation
of AF’s is that every individual agent reports an AF over
the exact same set of arguments [8, 14, 27]. Here, we in-
stead follow Coste-Marquis et al. [11], who have argued that
allowing for differences in the individual sets of arguments
is more realistic. Note that the case of a single shared set of
arguments is covered by our model as a special case.
4A different problem of rationalisability has recently been
proposed by Dunne et al. [13]: If you observe a set of sub-
sets of arguments, can it possibly correspond, for a given
semantics, to different extensions of some single AF?
With these definitions in place, we may now ask: For a
given set of constraints, can we characterise the class of all
profiles of AF’s that can be rationalised? And can we check
efficiently whether a given profile is rationalisable?
4. THE SINGLE-AGENT CASE
We first consider the single-agent case of the rationalisabil-
ity problem. This is not only useful for gaining an under-
standing of the multiagent case, but is also interesting in its
own right. For example, it may be the case that there is
some ‘ground truth’ available and we know what the cor-
rect attack-relation is (e.g., due to the logical structure of
the arguments), but that a specific agent is still reporting a
different AF. Can this subjective AF be explained in terms
of the value-based model? That is, is this framework com-
patible with what we know to be the ground truth?
Example 2. Consider a scenario with three arguments,
Arg “ tA,B,Cu, with a fixed master attack-relation á such
that A á B, B á C, and A á C. Suppose we observe a
single agent who only declares AÝ B and B Ý C. Can we
rationalise this omission of the attack of A on C? Clearly,
rationalisation requires A and C to be labelled with distinct
values, say vA and vC , and our agent must prefer vC to
vA for A á C to get cancelled. Are two values enough?
The answer is no: If we reuse, say, value vA to also label
argument B, then B á C would get cancelled as well. Simi-
larly, if we reuse vC for B, then Aá B would get cancelled.
Thus, we need a third value vB. Now there is a rationalisa-
tion, with the agent’s preference order ranking vC above vA,
and vB being incomparable to the other two values. Observe
that, even with three values, rationalisation is impossible if
we require the preference order to be complete, i.e., if we
require it to not leave any two values incomparable.
In the single-agent case, we are given an AF xArg,Ýy. A
solution consists of an AVAF xArg,á,Val, val,ěy, over the
same set of arguments Arg, that induces Ý. We consider
this problem for several types of constraints on solutions.
Fact 1 (No constraints). In the absence of con-
straints, every single AF is rationalisable.
Proof. Given the AF xArg,Ýy to be rationalised, let
páq :“ pÝq, choose the value-labelling xVal, val y arbitrar-
ily, and let pěq :“ Valˆ Val (meaning that our agent is in-
different between any two values). Then it is easy to check
that Ý is induced by the AVAF xArg,á,Val, val,ěy.
Our proof shows that the same result also applies to ra-
tionalisation under any set of constraints referring only to
Val and val. It also continues to apply if we require the
preference order to be complete. The main insight here is
that any natural instance of the single-agent problem that
is nontrivial will involve a constraint on the master attack-
relation. Therefore, for the remainder of this section, we
only consider rationalisability problems with a given fixed
master attack-relation.
Proposition 2 (Fixed attack-relation). A single
AF xArg,Ýy is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed
master attack-relation á if and only if all of the following
are the case:
piq pÝq Ď páq;
piiq pázÝq is acyclic;
piiiq pÝq X pázÝq` “ H.
Proof sketch. In this setting, there are no constraints
on xVal, val y. The first important insight then is that hav-
ing more available values means more flexibility: we can
rationalise if and only if we can rationalise by labelling ev-
ery argument with a distinct value. Thus, we may think of
the arguments themselves as representing values: w.l.o.g.,
assume that Val “ Arg and that val is the identity function.
Hence, we can think of ě as operating directly on arguments
and need not consider values any longer.
Condition piq is required, as our agent can never add (but
only remove) edges. Let R :“ pázÝq denote the set of
edges to be removed. We must have R´1 Ď pąq to ensure
that the agent’s preference order does indeed remove all of
these edges. The second important insight now is that it is
never beneficial to add more pairs to the preference order
than we are absolutely forced to. That is, we should choose
ą as small as possible, namely as the transitive closure of
R´1. We then still need to check two things. First, we need
to check that pR´1q` is the strict part of some preorder,
i.e., that it is transitive and irreflexive. This is equivalent to
condition piiq, to R being acyclic. Second, we need to check
that we are not removing any edges that should in fact stay,
i.e., we need to make sure that pÝq X R` “ H, which is
condition piiiq.
All three conditions can be checked in polynomial time, so
we obtain a tractability result:
Corollary 3 (Fixed attack-relation). Whether a
single AF is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed
master attack-relation can be decided in polynomial time.
Note that our proof of Proposition 2 shows that requiring
the preference order to be strict (i.e., not allowing any in-
differences) does not affect rationalisability. On the other
hand, our proof does not apply in case the preference order
is required to be complete (this case will instead be covered
by Proposition 6 below).
As discussed, a crucial ingredient of Proposition 2 and
its proof was the fact that there were no constraints on the
value-labelling. We now investigate what happens when we
add such constraints, and first consider the most extreme
case where the full value-labelling is fixed from the outset.
This is a natural scenario to consider in those cases in which
we are willing to assume that the question of which value a
given argument relates to is a matter that can be settled in
an objective manner.
Proposition 4 (Fixed value-labelling). A single
AF xArg,Ýy is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed
master attack-relation á and a given fixed value-labelling
xVal, val y if and only if all of the following are the case:
piq pÝq Ď páq;
piiq the relation ŤApázÝqBtpvalpAq, valpBqqu is acyclic;
piiiq pÝq X pázÝq`val “ H.
Proof sketch. As for Proposition 2, condition piq re-
flects that our agent cannot add new edges. The crucial
difference to the scenario of Proposition 2 is that now we
cannot remove edges between arguments that are labelled
with the same value. Let R :“ pázÝq be the set of edges
we need to remove. At the level of the values, this induces
the relation
Ť
pA,BqPRtpvalpAq, valpBqqu mentioned in con-
dition piiq. As before, the best we can do is to choose as
small a preference order as possible, so we should use the
transitive closure of the inverse of that relation on values.
Condition piiq then amounts to checking that this is indeed
a well-formed preference order. Note that acyclicity implies
irreflexivity, so we are correctly checking that we are not
trying to remove an edge between two arguments labelled
with the same value. Finally, we need to check that we are
not removing any edges that should stay. This is taken care
of by condition piiiq. To see this, note that R`val is the set of
edges getting removed.
Also this characterisation immediately provides us with a
polynomial algorithm. Thus, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 5 (Fixed value-labelling). Whether a
single AF is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed
master attack-relation and a given fixed value-labelling can
be decided in polynomial time.
The final single-agent scenario we want to consider here
is one where we are not given the full value-labelling but
merely an upper bound on the number of values that may be
used for rationalisation.5 This scenario comes about when
there is no unique objective mapping from arguments to
values and we are looking for a “simple” explanation for an
observed defeat-relation only involving a limited number of
different values. From an algorithmic point of view, this
is the most demanding problem considered so far. Still, at
least for the case of complete preferences, also for this prob-
lem we are able to establish the existence of a polynomial
algorithm, as the following result shows.
Proposition 6 (Bound on values). Whether a sin-
gle AF is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed mas-
ter attack-relation, a given upper bound on the number of
values, and a complete preference order can be decided in
polynomial time.
Proof. We are going to show how to translate our prob-
lem into an integer program with at most two variables per
inequality. Deciding feasibility of such programs is known
to be polynomial [18].
Let xArg,Ýy be the AF, á the master attack-relation,
and k (with k ď |Arg|) the upper bound on the number of
values. Observe that, if rationalisation is possible with fewer
than k values, then it certainly is possible with exactly k
values. As the rationalising preference order is required to
be complete, w.l.o.g., we may assume that Val “ t1, . . . , ku
and that ě is the usual relation ě defined over the natural
numbers. Clearly, if pÝq Ę páq, then rationalisation is
impossible. So, from now on, assume that pÝq Ď páq.
For every argument A P Arg, introduce an integer vari-
able xA. We use inequalities of the form 1 ď xA and xA ď k
to ensure that each such variable must take a value from
Val. Thus, these variables encode val. We have to be able
to model two types of constraints. First, if A á B but not
AÝ B, then we must ensure that the value of B is strictly
preferred to the value of A: xA` 1 ď xB . Second, if AÝ B
5Thus, this scenario requires solving the decision problem
corresponding to the optimisation problem of computing the
minimal number of values needed for rationalisation.
(and thus, by our assumption, also A á B), then we must
ensure that the value of B is not strictly preferred to the
value of A: because of completeness, this can be written as
xB ď xA. The integer program thus constructed is feasible
if and only if rationalisation is possible.
Let us reiterate that our proof makes use of the condition
that the rationalising preference order should be complete.
Without it, we would not be able to map requirements of
the form valpBq ­ą valpAq into linear constraints. Assum-
ing completeness of the preference order (i.e., excluding the
possibility of an agent not being able to compare the im-
portance of two given values) is sometimes reasonable, but
certainly not always. Whether single-agent rationalisabil-
ity for a bounded number of values remains polynomial for
possibly incomplete preferences is an open question.
5. THE MULTIAGENT CASE
We now turn to the multiagent case. In presenting our re-
sults for each type of constraint considered, we will specif-
ically focus on the extent to which the (positive) results
obtained for the single-agent case carry over to this more
general scenario. To get started, recall that we have seen
that in the absence of constraints, every single AF can be
rationalised (Fact 1). The following example shows that this
result does not generalise to profiles with (at least) two AF’s.
Example 3. Consider a profile of two AF’s over a com-
mon set of three arguments. Suppose A Ý1 B, B Ý1 C,
and C Ý1 A, while pÝ2q “ H. Any value-labelled AF and
preference profile that could possibly rationalise this profile
would have to have an attack-relation á that includes, at
least, the attacks A á B, B á C, and C á A, as other-
wise these edges could not have occurred in the first AF. But
this means that the second preference order, to be able to
cancel these attacks, must at least include the comparisons
valpBq ą2 valpAq, valpCq ą2 valpBq, and valpAq ą2 valpCq.
But then ą2 is not acyclic. Thus, this profile cannot be ra-
tionalised, even in the absence of any kind of constraint.
Under what circumstances can we decompose a given mul-
tiagent rationalisability problem into a set of n single-agent
rationalisability problems that can be solved independently
of each other? For the scenarios covered by Propositions 2
and 4 this is easily seen to be possible:
‚ If the only constraint is that the master attack-relation
is fixed, then every agent’s rationalisability problem
can be solved independently.
‚ If the only constraints are that master attack-relation
and value-labelling are fixed, then every agent’s ratio-
nalisability problem can also be solved independently.
But what if the master attack-relation is not given? Con-
sider profile AF “ pxArg1,Ý1y, . . . , xArgn,Ýnyq. Any ra-
tionalisation ofAF must involve a master attack-relationá
with páq Ě pÝ1qY ¨ ¨ ¨Y pÝnq, because no agent can create
an edge not already included in á. Any additional edges
in á will make rationalisation only harder, if they make a
difference at all. Thus, rationalisation is possible at all if
and only if rationalisation is possible with the fixed master
attack-relation páq :“ pÝ1q Y ¨ ¨ ¨ Y pÝnq.
Given these insights, together with Corollaries 3 and 5,
we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7 (Decomposable cases). Whether a
profile of AF’s is rationalisable can be decided in polynomial
time by solving the problem independently for each agent, in
at least the following cases:
paq No constraints are given.
pbq Only the master attack-relation is fixed.
pcq Only the value-labelling is fixed.
pdq Master attack-relation and value-labelling are fixed.
Thus, of all the constraints we have considered here, only
the one specifying an upper bound on the number of val-
ues actually leads to a “genuine” multiagent rationalisation
problem. Let us now consider this problem in some detail.
For the remainder of the paper, we will always assume that
a fixed master attack-relation á is part of the constraints
considered. By our reasoning above, any tractability result
obtained under this assumption immediately extends to the
case where no master attack-relation is specified.
Our first result on multiagent rationalisation with a bound
on the number of values to be used is negative: In the most
general case this problem is intractable.
Proposition 8 (General case). Deciding whether a
profile of AF’s is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given
fixed master attack-relation and a given upper bound (of at
least 3) on the number of values is an NP-complete problem.
Proof. NP-membership is immediate. To prove NP-
hardness we provide a reduction from Graph Colouring,
which is known to be NP-hard [20]. Recall that in Graph
Colouring we are given an undirected graph G “ pV,Eq
and ask whether it is possible to colour the vertices V using
at most k ě 3 colours such that no two vertices with the
same colour are linked by an edge in E.
So take any instance of Graph Colouring with graph
G “ pV,Eq and bound k. Let m :“ |V |. We build an
instance of our rationalisation problem for m arguments,
n :“ `m
2
˘
agents, and a bound of k on the number of values
as follows. First, let Arg :“ V be the full set of arguments,
and let the master attack-relation á be an arbitrary orien-
tation of G. Second, for every pair A ­“ B P Arg we cre-
ate exactly one agent i, with Argi “ tA,Bu and an empty
defeat-relation pÝiq “ H. (That is, there indeed are `m2 ˘
agents.) Now consider any edge pA,Bq in G. As either
A á B or B á A, but neither A Ýi B nor B Ýi A, the
corresponding agent i must strictly rank valpAq and valpBq,
i.e., they must be different. As this is so for all edges in
G and all agents, any two arguments linked in G must get
labelled with distinct values. Hence, G is k-colourable if and
only if the profile of AF’s we constructed can be rationalised
using at most k values.
This is bad news. But are there special cases where ratio-
nalisability is tractable after all? Observe that our proof
heavily relied on the fact that different agents may be aware
of different sets of arguments. This often is a reasonable as-
sumption [11], but the special case where all agents consider
the exact same set of arguments certainly is also of interest.
Whether rationalisability for a given bound on the number
of values remains intractable for this domain restriction is an
open question. Furthermore, note that Graph Colouring
is not NP-hard for k “ 2 colours, so our proof of intractabil-
ity does not cover the case of exactly two values. Whether
Proposition 8 can be strengthened to a bound of 2 is yet
another interesting open question.
Recall that in case there is no bound on the number of val-
ues (or, equivalently, if k “ |Arg|), we already know that ra-
tionalisation is tractable (as this follows from Proposition 7).
Our final result shows that the problem remains tractable
when the bound k is “large”—in the sense of only reducing
the number of allowed values by a constant d (relative to the
maximum k “ |Arg|).
Proposition 9 (Large bound on values). Let d P
N be an arbitrary constant. Whether AF “ pxArg1,Ý1y,. . .,xArgn,Ýnyq is rationalisable by an AVAF with a given fixed
master attack-relation and at most k :“ |Arg1Y¨ ¨ ¨YArgn|´d
values can be decided in polynomial time.
Proof. Let m :“ |Arg1Y¨ ¨ ¨YArgn|. There are p :“
`pm2 q
d
˘
ways of selecting d pairs from amongst all pairs of distinct
arguments. This number is exponential only in d (not in m).
Thus, as d is constant, p is polynomial. Note that p is a (gen-
erous) upper bound on the number of ways we can divide the
m arguments into k “ m´ d clusters: For any desired divi-
sion into k clusters, there exists a choice of d pairs such that
we obtain that clustering by merging exactly those pairs.
Note that it is not important which value is used to la-
bel a given argument: if rationalisation is possible at all, it
remains possible after any given permutation of the values.
The class of all clusterings with k clusters thus represents
all relevant value-labellings with k values. Also note that, if
rationalisation is possible with fewer than k values, then it
certainly is possible with exactly k values. So we only need
to check labellings with exactly k values.
To summarise, we have shown that our original ratio-
nalisation problem can be reduced to polynomially many
(namely, p) new rationalisation problems, each for the
same fixed master attack-relation and its own fixed value-
labelling. But each of these individual problems is polyno-
mial by Proposition 7 (item d), so we are done.
6. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
There are a number of different application scenarios where
dealing with questions of rationalisability will be valuable.
In this section, we list and illustrate some of them.
First, given the growing interest in the abstract argumen-
tation research community in questions of aggregation of
AF’s [8, 11, 14, 27], it is important to have a clear un-
derstanding for what types of scenarios the question of ag-
gregation is in fact relevant. Our notion of rationalisabil-
ity provides a suitable definition for this purpose. It al-
lows for a systematic scan of the different examples used
in the literature—not to dismiss those failing the test, but
to point out that one must be careful with the interpre-
tation used. For instance, let us see whether the example
given by Coste-Marquis et al. [11, Example 7] passes the test.
We are given AF1 “ xtA,B,E, F u, tpA,Bq, pB,Aq, pE,F quy,
AF2 “ xtB,C,D,E, F u, tpB,Cq, pC,Dq, pF,Equy, and
AF3 “ xtE,F u, tpE,F quy. It indeed does pass the test. This
profile is rationalisable using as master attack-relation the
union of the individual relations. But how many values are
required to rationalise it? We see that it is sufficient to set
valpEq ­“ valpF q, while A,B,C,D can take the same value,
either that of E or that of F . Thus, two values suffice.
Second, in applications where multiple AF’s need to be
aggregated, we may use the notion of rationalisability to
choose between alternative aggregation techniques, depend-
ing on the result of the rationalisability test. For example, if
a profile turns out to be rationalisable for a given preference
model (e.g., for complete preference orders), we may reason-
ably assume that this model is a good abstraction of reality
and aggregate the AF’s by aggregating the inferred prefer-
ences (which is a much better studied problem than that
of aggregating AF’s). For instance, we may use the well-
known Kemeny rule to aggregate the preferences, and then
apply the collective preference order obtained to the master
attack-relation inferred. But when rationalisation fails, this
approach does not make sense, and we should look for a dif-
ferent method of aggregation. In that case, there is a more
substantial disagreement: maybe the model of preferences
has to be changed, maybe the agents differ on the assignment
of values to arguments, or maybe the agents interpret the
arguments differently. Importantly, failure of rationalisation
can also provide hints as to where disagreement occurs.
Third, value-based argumentation systems are used in
practice as a modelling tool for online debating plat-
forms [23]. In this context, AF’s are (typically) not ob-
tained via a one-shot process, but rather retrieved interac-
tively. Our approach could be used to detect inconsistencies
as they occur, and thus to trigger clarification questions on
the fly. Suppose, for instance, the following sequence occurs:
‚ Agent 1: A defeats B.
‚ Agent 2: B defeats A.
‚ Agent 3: There is no defeat between A and B.
At this stage it is clear that this collection of AF’s cannot be
rationalised. A clarification is required to identify the mis-
match. For example, the system could ask agent 3 whether
she really believes there is no attack between A and B.
Finally, it is interesting to note that our methodology can
also be fruitfully combined with other approaches. Specif-
ically, in many contexts, the input information provided is
not directly an AF, but rather a set of acceptable arguments
(i.e., an extension). This is the case, in particular, when the
objective is to analyse a posteriori whether a given deci-
sion can be explained. A recent example of this kind is the
study of a participatory decision setting involving an envi-
ronmental project in Que´bec reported on by Tremblay and
Abi-Zeid [28]. In their case analysis, they extracted seven
values and attached them to arguments. They then enumer-
ated all possible AVAF’s, getting an overwhelming number
of such frameworks, to test whether and how often the de-
cision recommended by a given framework coincides with
the decision actually observed in practice. Interestingly, by
combining our technique and an approach for inferring AF’s
from target extensions [5, 13], a different methodology could
be used instead: For a set of observed acceptable arguments,
we may first apply such a technique to obtain candidate ra-
tionalisable AF’s, and then apply our rationalisation method
to check whether the AF is rationalisable for some values,
against the ground truth built by extraction.
Suppose, for instance, that, regarding three arguments
tA,B,Cu and using one of Dung’s semantics, agent 1 re-
ports extension tAu, agent 2 reports tA,Cu, and agent 3 re-
ports tA,Bu. Realising these extensions—starting from an
empty AF and considering a single defeat relation amongst
arguments for simplicity—it must be the case that AÝ1 B
and A Ý1 C, while the relation between B and C is either
(1-i) B Ý1 C, (1-ii) C Ý1 B, or (1-iii) no defeat between
B and C. Now, for agent 2, there must be no defeat be-
tween A and C, leaving five possible cases: (2-i) A Ý2 B
and C Ý2 B, (2-ii) A Ý2 B and B Ý2 C, (2-iii) C Ý2 B
and B Ý2 A, (2-iv) AÝ2 B, or (2-v) C Ý2 B. Finally, for
agent 3, we have no defeat relation between A and B, and
thus either (3-i) A Ý3 C and B Ý3 C, (3-ii) B Ý3 C and
C Ý3 A, (3-iii) A Ý3 C and C Ý3 B, (3-iv) A Ý3 C, or
(3-v) B Ý3 C. But now, in terms of rationalisation, we see
that some combinations are impossible, such as for instance
(1-iii, 2-ii, 3-iii). To see this, note that the master attack-
relation would have to contain both B á C (for agent 2)
and C á B (for agent 3). But then agent 1 would have
to have one of these attack relations in her system, as she
cannot both strictly prefer the value of B to that of C and
vice versa. While this does not allow us to uniquely define
a collection of AF’s, this method can nevertheless guide the
search for AF’s compatible with the extensions observed.
7. CONCLUSION
We have introduced the concept of rationalisability of a pro-
file of abstract argumentation frameworks, proposed a spe-
cific instantiation of the general idea in terms of social values
associated with the arguments and preferences over those
values held by the agents, and studied the resulting deci-
sion problem from an algorithmic point of view, for several
types of constraints on admissible solutions. We have been
able to show that the single-agent rationalisability problem
is tractable for all the constraints considered. These posi-
tive results extend to the multiagent case for several types
of constraints. However, in the presence of a constraint lim-
iting the number of values we may use, the most general
variant of the multiagent problem is NP-complete.6
While our technical results offer a good initial overview
of the landscape of rationalisability, our work also pinpoints
a number of interesting open questions. These include the
complexity of single-agent rationalisability with a limited
number of values for incomplete preferences, as well as the
identification of further tractable cases of the multiagent ra-
tionalisability problem with a limited number of values.
Besides addressing these questions, future work should
also investigate alternative instantiations of the general idea
of rationalisability expounded here. For instance, as men-
tioned already in the introduction, the model of Bench-
Capon [6] is but one approach to modelling the emergence
of different individual argumentation frameworks. Defining
the rationalisability problem for competing approaches is
likely to be fruitful as well. Another idea, still within the
value-based framework, is to treat the fact that agents may
be aware of different sets of arguments somewhat differently.
In this paper, we have projected the master attack-relation
onto each individual argument set before rationalisation. Al-
ternatively, one could ask whether there exists a possible
completion of an agent’s individual defeat-relation for the
full set of arguments induced by her preferences.
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6Recall that we have assumed attack relations to be irreflex-
ive. The complexity of the rationalisability problem is not
affected by this assumption. As no assignment of values and
choice of preference orders can ever cancel out a self-attack,
all you need to do on top of checking our existing conditions
is checking that all agents agree on all self-attacks.
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